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1. Introduction 
 
This paper deals with empirical evidence on gradual retirement, which is a topical issue in 
shaping the ageing policies. Gradual retirement has provoked high hopes because of two 
reasons. Firstly, it is considered to reflect the preferences of the employees. Winding down the 
work commitments during a period of time is widely considered to be a more desired option 
than a single abrupt departure from the full-time job. Combining part-time work with partial 
pension is one way to achieve this preferred state. Secondly, gradual retirement has also been 
seen as an important tool in postponing the retirement age and making the pension systems 
more sustainable. In this reasoning, reduced hours help individuals to keep their work capacity 
and work motivation, which in turn enables the longer working careers.  
 
Accordingly, it is natural that a policy with two simultaneous positive effects is high on the 
agenda. However, it is not certain that the policy to encourage gradual retirement will 
automatically be successful. For instance, it can fail if the gradual retirement can only be 
achieved by too costly measures. One risk is that the subsidies for reduced hours (in the form 
of partial pension) need to be very high in order to make gradual retirement a real option for a 
sufficiently large share of ageing employees. The OECD, for instance, has pointed out that one 
has to get the incentives right. The Finnish part-time pension (available currently at ages 58-
67) has been used as an example of a system with high subsidy for this extra leisure time. 
Accordingly, one has to set the benefits against the costs of the scheme.  
 
In order for the part-time pension to make sense economically, it should extend the length of 
the working career. This holds true especially when the replacement rates of the part-time 
pension are relatively high. Combining pension benefits and wage is also possible after 
retirement to the old-age pension. Work after retirement is encouraged in Finland, where since 
the pension reform in 2005 new pension rights can be accrued when working after retirement. 
An interesting question is whether the timing of retirement and willingness to work after 
retirement are decisions related to each other.  
 
The analysis in this paper is carried out in the Finnish context, where the employees have a 
subjective right to choose their old-age pension retirement age between ages 63 to 68. Also in 
the case of part-time pension the individual takes the initiative, subject to the employer’s 
approval. This kind of setting emphasises individual decision-making subject to incentives 
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given by the pension system. It also makes it natural to examine the aspirations of the 
individuals regarding their future old-age retirement behaviour. 
 
The effects of many pension reforms will come true only gradually in the future after rather 
long transition periods. However, the need to estimate these effects is often immediate. These 
estimates are needed when one wants to assess, for instance, whether the likely effects on the 
effective retirement age large enough. Since no actual observations on retirement behaviour 
after the reform are available one has to rely on retirement expectations. Accordingly, 
retirement expectations have been analyzed in several earlier papers, mostly in the US, but also 
in European countries.  
 
One issue in this field of research has been comparison of retirement expectations and 
realizations (e.g. Bernheim, 1989, Disney and Tanner, 1999, Mastrogiacomo, 2003, Benítez-
Silva and Dwyer, 2005). It has been found that the expectations indeed predict realizations.1 
Another issue that has been investigated is whether changes in pension incentives or in other 
circumstances, like health, influence expected retirement behaviour (e.g. Chan and Stevens, 
2004, Botazzi et al., 2005, McGarry, 1999). The results of these studies show that retirement 
expectations are revised after policy changes or after changes in health status. In contrast to 
many of these studies we do not have longitudinal data on expected retirement behaviour, nor 
do we have data on realizations. However, we have several measures for planned or already 
realized forms of gradual retirement behaviour in a cross-sectional data set and we can 
examine their determinants and interactions.  
 
There is growing interest in gradual retirement, but the number of earlier studies is still rather 
limited. Furthermore, the concept `gradual retirement´2 itself is not necessarily a very clear 
one. Here we define gradual retirement as the following process: the individual reduces his or 
her working hours at the later stage of the working career at the same time receiving both 
earnings and pension (either partial of full pension). More specifically, in our case gradual 
retirement takes place when the individual takes the part-time pension prior to full-time 
retirement (at the same time reducing the working hours roughly to half, typically in the 
                                                
1 Some economists have mixed feelings about using data on individuals’ perceptions and intentions (e.g. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan, 2001). On the other hand, there exists evidence that intention variables indeed predict actual 
behaviour. In psychological literature this is justified by the theory of planned behaviour (e.g. Ajzen, 1991). 
2 Sometimes concepts phased or partial retirement are used instead of gradual retirement. One should not confuse 
the concept `gradual retirement´ with the concept `flexible retirement´ where workers are given a range of ages 
over which they can retire so that the transition from work to retirement remains a single abrupt departure.  
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current job). Gradual retirement takes also place when the individual chooses to work (at least 
somewhat) even after he or she has taken the full-time pension and has quitted the career job.  
 
Institutions relevant to gradual retirement vary remarkably. In some countries the pension 
system may include elements that are tailored to encourage gradual retirement, while the 
opposite is true in other countries. For instance, special part-time pensions may be designed to 
be substitutes for full-time early retirement. Furthermore, working while on old-age pension 
may be encouraged by removing earnings tests in these schemes and by giving new pension 
credits for the earnings received after retirement. Workers may also be permitted to draw a 
portion of their standard old-age pension early while still working. If the pension system 
includes elements listed above, the popularity of gradual retirement is likely to be noticeable.  
 
The institutions are naturally related to the relevant research questions. The US literature has 
paid attention to the role of so-called `bridge jobs`. Bridge jobs are held subsequent to career 
employment and prior to retirement. According to Ruhm (1990) and Delsen and Reday-
Mulvey (1996) they have been rather common, and often they have been part-time. It has been 
difficult to reduce working hours in the career job (Abraham and Houseman, 2004). Thus, an 
employee wishing to reduce working hours needs typically to find another job, which is likely 
to be one reason for the large number of bridge jobs.  
 
The US type of “gradual retirement” is not based insurance-based subsidies to older workers 
reducing their working hours. According to the OECD (2006), in Finland and Sweden part-
time pensions have been generous enough to attract a large share of older workers to use them 
as a bridge to retirement.3 This paper deals with an institutional setting where gradual 
retirement is subsidised. The relevant question is then to ask whether the subsidies in question 
help to raise the effective old-age retirement age.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the institutional setting. In 
Section 3 we describe the data set and variables that we are using. In section 4 we present 
estimation results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
                                                
3 Some analysts confirm the conclusion that the popularity of the former Swedish part-time pension is explained by 
its generosity.  According to Wadensjö (1996) high replacement rates of the scheme help to understand why it 
became more popular than in other countries. Latulippe and Turner (2000) also argue that the number of workers 
taking the partial pension option has been higher during periods when replacement rate was higher and/or 
unemployment rate was higher.  
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2. Institutional aspects of the Finnish pension system 
2.1. Part-time pension and early exit policy 
 
In order to keep the pension systems sustainable, economically active life span has to adapt to 
longer life spans. In countries with many early retirement pathways these challenges have been 
most urgent, and Finland is one of those countries. Accordingly, early exit arrangements have 
witnessed many reforms during the last decade (see Ilmakunnas & Takala, 2005).  
 
There are four types of early exit pathways. These are the voluntary early retirement path (early 
old-age pension), the disability path (disability pension and individual early retirement 
pension), the unemployment path (unemployment pension) and the gradual retirement path 
(mainly part-time pension) (Gould and Saurama, 2004).4 The effective retirement age is 
currently 59.1 years, which clearly indicates that these early exit arrangements are widely used.  
 
However, the change from the policy promoting early retirement to the policy promoting 
staying at work has been rapid. Most early retirement schemes (individual early retirement 
pension, early old-age pension and part-time pension) were introduced only in the late 1980s.5 
Already in the 1990s early retirement schemes were targets for several changes that aimed at 
reducing their popularity. Accordingly, the “golden era” of early retirement policies was 
actually quite short in Finland.6  
 
It is interesting to consider the role of the part-time pension in this rapid policy shift. Part-time 
pension is granted to an employed person who changes from full-time work to part-time work 
(full-time working hours are reduced to 16-28 hours a week). The part-time pension benefit is 
50 per cent of the difference between full-time and part-time earnings. The pension reform in 
2005 increased the eligibility age by two years (from 56 to 58) for persons born after 1946. 7 
 
This scheme enabling gradual retirement has witnessed many reforms during its 20-year 
history. First the lower age limit in the private sector was 60 years. Its motivation was to enable 
                                                
4 After a transition period the unemployment pension and the individual early retirement pension are abolished as a 
part of the pension reform 2005. 
5 The part-time pension scheme was introduced in 1987 in the private sector and the public sector followed in 
1989. The corresponding Swedish scheme was in many respects used as a model for it (Takala, 2002).  
6 In the pension reforms since the early 1990s the age limits for the early retirement schemes have been raised, 
some schemes are totally abolished and also the incentives have been modified so that the schemes have become 
less generous both for the employees and the employers. 
7 Furthermore, the old-age pension accrual on the part-time pension time (non-working time) is smaller than before 
(reduction from 1.5 % to 0.75 %).  
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smooth transition from work to retirement and to make more room for individual circumstances 
in retirement decisions. Accordingly, it was also considered as a scheme that makes the work 
commitments meet the reduced work capacity during the later years in the labour market. 
Furthermore, it was expected that the use of part-time pension would reduce the use of the 
disability pensions.  
 
In its early years, the popularity of this scheme was low, much lower than expected when 
creating the scheme. Accordingly, changes were introduced in order to make it more widely 
used. The age limit was first lowered from 60 years to 58 years in 1994 and later, in 1998, to 56 
years. Secondly, from 1994 onwards, new pension rights were accrued also on the basis of the 
difference between the full-time wage and the part-time wage (in addition to the part-time 
earnings). Thus, using part-time pension did not diminish the level of old-age pension. The 
part-time pension was seen as a tool to lengthen the working careers, and its generosity was 
increased at the same time as the other early retirement schemes started to face restrictions. 
 
These changes made the scheme much more popular since the late 1990s. Furthermore, large 
part of the rapid increase in the employment rates in the older age groups is related to this 
scheme. In the age group 60-64 the number of part-time pensioners (and accordingly part-time 
workers) has risen remarkably, but the employment rate for those working full-time has risen 
only a little during the last ten years. Currently the share of part-time pensioners is nearly 25 per 
cent among the employed in the age group, up from a level of 9 per cent ten years earlier. Also 
for the age group 55-59 part-time pensions have played an important role. Naturally, the 
increases in the use of part-time pensions and part-time work imply that the number of hours 
worked has grown less rapidly than the number of the employed.  
 
Thus, increased use of part-time pensions has been one important element behind the good 
employment performance among older workers, especially in the age group 60-64. But it is also 
important to consider the costs of this development. In evaluating the economic desirability of 
the scheme one has to consider many elements. First, financing these pensions implies a direct 
cost to the pension system. Second, the reduction in working hours also affects the pension 
finances negatively. On the other hand, part-time pensions may lengthen the working careers. 
This mitigates the negative effect of the reduced working hours. Furthermore, for some persons 
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the alternative is not full-time work but some other early retirement pension. In those cases the 
economic effect is positive.8  
 
Figure 1: Employment rate and part-time pension (age groups 55-59, 60-64) 
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Source: Labour Force in Finland, Statistics Finland & Pension Statistics, Finnish Centre for Pensions 
 
In the current institutional setting other early retirement schemes (except disability pension) are 
being abolished. This implies that the alternative for the use of part-time pension is less often 
full-time retirement. Accordingly, it becomes an even more important question whether the 
longer working careers (due to part-time pension) can compensate the negative effect of 
reduced working hours at the later stage of the working life. In this paper we try to investigate 
whether and to what extent the use of part-time pension helps to postpone retirement. Prior to 
this investigation we consider the rules for the old-age pension.  
 
2.2. Flexible old-age pension 
 
The formerly fixed retirement age has become flexible. Thus, the role of individual decision-
making (or optimization) has been increased in the timing of retirement. Currently an employee 
                                                
8 In this paper we analyze whether the part-time pension helps to postpone the retirement age beyond the lower age 
limit of the so-called flexible old-age retirement age. There might also be a positive effect operating at younger 
ages. It is not considered here.  
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who has turned 63 can decide him- or herself the date of commencement of the pension: he or 
she may retire on an old-age pension between the ages 63 and 68. There is a sharp increase in 
the accrual rate at the age of 63 (from 1.9 per cent to 4.5 per cent), which is the incentive to 
persuade individuals to postpone the retirement (after the age of 63). Furthermore, there is no 
cap on the replacement rate in the reformed pension system (in the old system the pension could 
not exceed 60 per cent of the highest wage). Accordingly, employment at older ages has 
become more effective way to increase one’s level of pension.  
 
There is also an option to take the pension at the age of 62 with a reduction in the level of the 
pension (the reduction rate being 0.6 per cent per month, i.e. 7.2 per cent at the most). There is 
also the possibility to postpone the retirement beyond the age of 68. The pension is then 
increased by 0.4 per cent for each month for which it is postponed.  
 
Employment at the older ages is also encouraged by making it more beneficial to combine an 
old-age pension with work. A person drawing an old-age pension may work and have earnings 
without limitations. Furthermore, new pension rights are then accrued up to the age of 68, the 
accrual rate being 1.5 per cent (instead of 4.5 per cent). This new pension accrual is added up to 
the former old-age pension at the age of 68.  
 
Also those on part-time pension can choose themselves when they stop working altogether and 
start to draw the full-time pension within the age bracket 63-68. Furthermore, the part-time 
pensioners born in 1946 or earlier can retire on an early old-age pension between the ages 60 
and 62.9 
 
3. Data set and variables 
 
Our basic data set is the Quality of Work Life Survey (QWLS) of Statistics Finland from year 
2003 (Lehto and Sutela, 2005). The initial sample for QWLS is derived from a monthly Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), where a random sample of working age population is selected for a 
telephone interview. The QWLS is based on a sample of LFS respondents in October and 
November 2003 who were 15-65 old wage and salary earners with normal weekly working 
time of at least five hours. The sample consists of over 4000 individuals. We concentrate on 
                                                
9 If the person on the part-time pension retires to an old-age pension between the ages 60 and 62, the reduction for 
early retirement is calculated in accordance with the old rules from the age of 65 (the reduction rate being 0.4 % 
per month). This early retirement is likely to be economically unwise, since at the age of 63 he or she may retire on 
old-age pension with no reductions made in old-age pension.  
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those QWLS participants who are over 56, but under 64 years old.10 The data set includes 398 
such individuals, but because of missing observations on some variables, the data set used in 
the econometric analysis has 382 observations. 
 
QWLS includes questions on the personal characteristics of the respondents, and a large set of 
questions on perceived working conditions. In the 2003 survey there were special questions on 
the pension plans of the respondents. These are our key variables of interest. Statistics Finland 
supplements QWLS with information from the LFS, such as working time and exact labour 
market status. Supplementary information on e.g. the employer, the level of education of the 
respondents and their taxable earnings is matched from various registers maintained by 
Statistics Finland. In addition, the Finnish Centre for Pensions has supplemented the QWLS 
data set with register information on e.g. working career, some pension benefits, and part-time 
pensions.11 
 
Our interest centres on three dependent variables and their relationships. First, we have a binary 
indicator PARTIAL_RETIREMENT for those who are on part-time pension (based on register 
information) or who have already applied for such pension (based on the survey). Second, we 
have information from the survey on the preferred retirement age. As is common in this kind of 
surveys, the answers tend to be bunched to certain years, in our case to 60, 63, and 65 (see 
Figure 2). One interpretation of this is that the answers do not relate to mean but rather to most 
likely retirement age (Bernheim, 1989). We have therefore formed a binary indicator 
RETIREMENT_OVER_63 for those whose preferred retirement age is over 63 years (which is 
the lower age limit of the so called flexible retirement age and used to be the common 
retirement age for many individuals in the state pension system).12 Thirdly, we have a binary 
indicator RETIRE_AND_WORK for those who are ready to continue working while they are 
retired. 
 
                                                
10 For this sample the rules for the part-time pension are the same (e.g. the eligibility age). The choice of the upper 
age limit is motivated by the fact that we are interested in the decision to retire on old-age pension at the age of 64 
or over.  
11 Also Forma et al. (2005) have used the same data to analyse the intentions of older workers to continue working. 
Their interest is concentrated to the desired old-age retirement age instead of gradual retirement. Karisalmi (2005) 
uses the data to analyze the relationship between atypical work and retirement aspirations. 
12 When discussing the robustness of our results we also model retirement age as an ordered variable: below 63, 
63, and above 63. Disney and Tanner (1999) have used a similar cut-off. They also discuss the role of “don’t 
know” answers and argue that answering this way may be a rational response when there is lots of uncertainty, e.g. 
because there are still many years to retirement. This does not seem to be a problem in the present study, since we 
concentrate on over 56 years old persons and in our sample the share of “don’t know” answers is only 1.5 per cent 
among them (these answers are not included in Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Preferred retirement ages 
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Note: Respondents are in age group 57 to 63 
Source: Quality of Working Life Survey 
 
These three indicators are likely to affect each other. In particular, to evaluate the effects of 
partial retirement it is essential to examine whether it lengthens the time to full retirement, i.e. 
whether PARTIAL_RETIREMENT affects RETIREMENT_OVER_63 positively. 
Furthermore, the relationship between retirement age and continuing work while retired is 
interesting.  
 
As explanatory variables we use various characteristics of the individual, job, and employer (a 
detailed description of all the variables is in Appendix 1). The variable CAREER measures the 
years of work experience (based on pension registers). Long working career tends to increase 
the willingness to use part-time pension. It may also make the individual more likely to choose 
a lower rather than higher old-age retirement age within the “window” of flexible retirement 
age (63-68). Basically long working career can decrease the motivations to further continue 
one’s career since working capacity may decrease over time in many occupations. It may also 
increase the personal feeling that one has already worked long enough in the labour market, 
and it is fair to be able to retire. Long work career naturally also tends to increase the accrued 
pension, and thus make it economically possible to retire earlier (the income effect). Since we 
control for self-assessed working capacity (CAPACITY), CAREER is likely then to catch the 
other effects listed above. For those who have a temporary employment relationship we use an 
indicator TEMPORARY. Since the part-time pension is subject to the employer’s approval, it 
is unlikely that temporary employees have opportunities for using it. 
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Age group dummies AGE_i are defined for groups i = 57,…,63. They also take into account 
the natural selection effect in the older age cohorts, i.e. those preferring to retire early have 
already done that and selected themselves out of the sample. We therefore expect there to be 
positive age effects on plans to retire at an age over 63.  
 
We measure education by dummies EDUCATION1 to EDUCATION4 for four educational 
levels. A priori we can expect more educated individuals to be prepared to work longer. We 
have indicators for females (FEMALE) and those who are married or cohabiting (dummy 
MARRIED). Being married may affect retirement decisions when both spouses want to retire 
at the same time. Unfortunately, our data do not have information on the age or the labour 
market status of the spouse. 
 
Earnings are taken into account by 4 wage group dummies (WAGE_i, i=1,…,4). Earnings have 
two kinds of effects. On one hand, higher earnings encourage people to continue working 
(substitution of leisure and consumption over the life cycle), but on the other hand people with 
higher incomes can afford to retire earlier (income effect). The earnings information is based 
on self-reported monthly earnings groups from the survey. For those already on partial 
retirement we have adjusted the wage groups, since the current wage does not reflect earnings 
potential in full-time work.13 
 
Working in physically or mentally unfavourable conditions (indicators 
HEAVY_PHYSICALLY and HEAVY_MENTALLY, respectively) is expected to have a 
positive impact on partial retirement and a negative impact on the probability of continuing to 
work after age 63. Also variables related to poor health can be expected to have similar effects. 
We measure health by a dummy for chronic illness (ILLNESS) and using a variable for self-
assessed work capacity (CAPACITY, measured as a score from 0 to 10). The former should 
have a negative and the latter a positive effect on the probability of continuing to work after 
age 63. The survey also has a question on self-assessed health, but we consider these two 
indicators more reliable. 
                                                
13 The wage variable is based on self-reported monthly wage groups. For those who are on partial retirement the 
variable gives the part-time earnings. Instead of these earnings, we would want to measure the potential earnings 
were the individual to continue in full-time work. We use the information on the amount of the part-time pension 
to calculate the wage level (the amount of pension is 50 % of the difference between full-time and part-time 
earnings). We have assumed that part-time earnings are half of full-time earnings. In practice this needs not to be 
the case since the reduction in working hours and earnings can vary within limits (full-time hours are reduced to 
16-28 hours). Furthermore, for some part-time pensioners the level of the pension is missing. For them the wage 
measure is based on the annual wage income of the previous year from the tax registers (divided by 12).  
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There are some differences between the private and public sectors since previously negotiated 
lower retirement ages have been protected in the pension reform (during a transition period).To 
account for these differences, we add dummy variables for belonging to private pension system 
(PRIVATE_SYSTEM). There is also an indicator for private pension insurance saving 
(OWN_PLAN). Having own private pension insurance is an indicator for planning to retire 
earlier, although it can also be used for compensating an otherwise low pension after normal 
retirement age. In principle, one can think that private insurance is endogenous, since same 
kind of individual factors that affect the likelihood of having a private insurance may affect the 
likelihood of e.g. staying longer in working life. On the other hand, the decision on acquiring a 
private insurance has already been made before the survey. 
 
Employer-related variables include indicators for the use of “unemployment pension pipeline” 
in the firm (PIPELINE)14 and an indicator for small firms (SMALL_PLANT). If the employer 
uses the unemployment pension pipeline for the employees in mid 50’s, it is likely that there is 
a need for reductions in the number of personnel and hours worked. It is then likely that at the 
same time the older employees are encouraged to use a partial retirement option so that further 
lay-offs could be avoided. The pipeline is also likely to affect the willingness (and 
opportunities) of continuing work after age 63. On the other hand, use of the pipeline should 
have no impact on plans to work while retired. Finally, small firms are likely to have more 
difficulties in adjusting their labour input when some employees are on partial retirement (see 
e.g. Latulippe and Turner 2000).15 This is taken into account with a dummy SMALL_PLANT 
for work places with less than 10 employees, which is expected to have a negative effect on the 
probability of being on part-time pension. 
                                                
14 Unemployment pension pipeline refers to the following arrangement: those who have become unemployed at the 
age of 55 or over have been able to receive earnings-related unemployment benefit until the age of 60, after which 
they have been entitled to unemployment pension. In pension reform 2005 unemployment pension will be re-
moved, but extended unemployment benefits are paid for those becoming unemployed at the age of 57 or more 
until they are eligible for old-age pension.  
 
15 In Finland there is partial experience rating in disability pensions and unemployment pensions for large firms, 
while part-time pensions lack that particular feature. Thus, large firms are likely to be more inclined to use part-
time pensions when there is need for downsizing.  
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4. Models and estimation results 
4.1. Basic results 
 
Our aim is to explain the prevalence of the three indicators of retirement with the 
characteristics of the individual, job characteristics, and variables that are related to incentives 
for lengthening the working life. Since we have formed binary indicators for them, we will use 
probit models. It is possible that these indicators are related with each other. First, the same 
unobserved characteristics of the individuals may affect all three decisions or plans, making the 
error terms of the individual models correlated with each other. Secondly, the phenomena may 
be more directly related through simultaneity. We therefore model the variables as a 
multivariate probit system. 
 
Our data set is a cross-section, but we can still hypothesize a recursive structure in the process 
how the individuals are formulating their retirement plans and aspirations. The decision on 
part-time retirement is made first; in fact, it has already been made before the survey. Given 
this decision, the individuals anticipate whether they plan to work beyond the age 63. Given 
their anticipated retirement age, they indicate whether they plan to continue working while on 
retirement. The model is recursive, since previously made decisions or plans affect the 
subsequent ones, but there is no feedback from the later decisions to previous ones. Because of 
the recursive structure the model can be estimated as a standard multivariate probit model with 
maximum likelihood16.  
 
Exclusion restrictions are not needed for identification in this kind of probit models (Wilde, 
2000), but it may still be a good practice to use some restrictions.17 First, we argue that 
working in a small firm is likely to affect the propensity to take partial retirement, but not the 
other decisions or plans. Second, people working on a temporary contract should have fewer 
opportunities for taking part-time pension, but it need not affect the other decisions. Third, 
having voluntary private pension insurance can affect decisions on part-time retirement and 
aspired retirement age, but it is not likely to affect plans to continue working while retired (at 
least when wage income is controlled). Fourth, the personnel policies of the current employer, 
measured by PIPELINE, and the current working conditions, HEAVY_PHYSICALLY and 
HEAVY_MENTALLY, should not affect plans to continue working while on retirement.  
                                                
16 The model is a special case of the model proposed by Heckman (1978). It is discussed e.g. in Greene (2003). 
17 Using the restrictions improves the validity of tests of exogeneity of the potentially endogenous explanatory 
dummy variables (essentially, tests of whether the correlations of the errors of the probit models are zero) when the 
distributional assumptions are misspecified (see Monfardini and Radice, 2006). 
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Hence, our exclusion restrictions are that SMALL_PLANT and TEMPORARY are excluded 
from the equations for RETIREMENT_OVER_63 and RETIRE_AND_WORK, and the 
variables OWN_PLAN, PIPELINE, HEAVY_PHYSICALLY, and HEAVY_MENTALLY are 
excluded from the equation for RETIRE_AND_WORK. 
 
Formally, we have three latent variables y1*, y2* and y3* and their observation rules (1(.) 
denotes an indicator function): 
 
y1* = X1β+ ε1 
PARTIAL_RETIREMENT = 1(y1*>0) 
 
y2* = α2PARTIAL_RETIREMENT + X2β+ ε2 
RETIREMENT_OVER_63 = 1(y2*>0) 
 
y3* = α3RETIREMENT_OVER_63 +X3β + ε3 
RETIRE_AND_WORK = 1(y3*>0) 
 
ε1, ε2, and ε3 are the errors and X1, X2, and X3 are the explanatory variables (including constant 
terms). The endogenous variables have a recursive structure and the exclusion restrictions are 
incorporated into the X’s. The three-equation multivariate probit model is estimated with 
simulated maximum likelihood (e.g. Cappelari and Jenkins, 2003). 
 
We cross-tabulate our dependent variables in Table 1. 23 per cent (=91/395) of the individuals 
are on partial retirement or have applied for it, and 33 per cent (=133/395) plan to continue 
working beyond age 63. The two variables, PARTIAL_RETIREMENT and 
RETIREMENT_OVER_63, are independent according to Pearson’s chi-squared test and also 
their correlation is low. This is mainly a result of fairly similar share of those who plan to 
continue working beyond age 63 among those who are on partial retirement and among those 
who are not on partial retirement. 35 per cent intend to continue to do some work when on 
retirement. Among those on partial retirement this share is 28 per cent. The correlation of 
PARTIAL_RETIREMENT and RETIRE_AND_WORK is actually negative, as among those 
on partial retirement the plans to continue working are less common. Again, however, the 
independence of the variables cannot be rejected. Finally, the last part of the table shows that 
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plans to continue working on retirement are more common among those who plan to retire after 
age 63. Also in this case, the variables are independent.  
 
Table 1. Cross-tabulation of the dependent variables 
PARTIAL_RETIREMENT RETIREMENT_OVER_63  Pearson χ2(1) Tetrachoric  
 0  1 Total  correlation 
0  203 101 304   
 (66.78) (33.22) (100.00)   
1  59 32 91   
 (64.84) (35.16) (100.00)   
Total 262 133 395 0.118 0.033 
 (68.24) (31.76) (100.00) (p = 0.731)  
PARTIAL_RETIREMENT RETIRE_AND_WORK  Pearson χ2(1) Tetrachoric  
 0  1 Total  correlation 
0  190 114 304   
 (62.50) (37.50) (100.00)   
1  65 26 91   
 (71.43) (28.57) (100.00)   
Total 255 140 395 2.440 -0.158 
 (64.56) (35.44) (100.00) (p = 0.118)  
RETIREMENT_OVER_63 RETIRE_AND_WORK  Pearson χ2(1) Tetrachoric  
 0  1 Total  correlation 
0  173 89 262   
 (66.03) (33.92) (100.00)   
1  82 51 133   
 (61.49) (38.51) (100.00)   
Total 255 140 395 0.738 0.074 
 (64.56) (35.44) (100.00) (p = 0.390)  
Note: the cross-tabulations are based on the subset of data for which all three variables are available. 
 
Although unconditional cross-tabulations do not reveal significant relationships between the 
variables, we may still find relationships between them when we control for other variables. 
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the multivariate probit model. The results show that 
the probability of being on part-time pension decreases with wage. Both the length of working 
career and having a medically diagnosed illness increases the probability, but working capacity 
is insignificant. There seem to be no significant differences between men and women, between 
married and single individuals, or between the educational groups in their probability of being 
on part-time pension. There is some indication that part-time pension is less probable in small 
plants, but this effect is significant only at 10.5 per cent level. Interestingly, variables related to 
the pension incentives of the employee or the employer, OWN_PLAN and PIPELINE, are not 
significant. 
 
As for retirement age anticipations, being already on part-time pension does not have a 
significant effect on the probability of thinking about continuing working after age 63 (the 
coefficient is even negative). This indicates that part-time pension does not lengthen the 
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working career. Age has a positive effect on the probability of retiring after age 63, which is 
natural since there is a selection effect in the older age cohorts (those preferring to retire early 
have already done that). Those with the highest educational level have clearly highest 
probability of lengthening their working life. Females are less likely to continue working 
longer, but marital status does not have a significant effect. Income has a negative effect on the 
probability of postponing retirement, which indicates that the income effect dominates the 
substitution effect. Chronic illness decreases the probability of continuing the working life, but 
working capacity is not significant. Among the work conditions variables mental strains at 
work have a negative effect. Having private pension insurance decreases anticipated retirement 
age, as expected. Finally, the use of unemployment pension pipeline in the firm significantly 
decreases the probability that the employees would plan to continue working beyond the age 
63. 
 
Table 2. Multivariate probit estimation results 
 
 PARTIAL_ 
RETIREMENT
RETIRE_ 
OVER_63 
RETIRE_ 
AND_WORK 
PARTIAL_RETIREMENT  -0.444
  (0.431)  
RETIRE_OVER_63   0.207 
   (0.391) 
AGE_58 -0.043 0.184 0.010 
 (0.242) (0.237) (0.242) 
AGE_59 0.284 0.523 -0.015 
 (0.210) (0.221)** (0.209) 
AGE_60 0.156 0.749 0.153 
 (0.260) (0.260)*** (0.265) 
AGE_61 0.127 0.684 -0.049 
 (0.327) (0.308)** (0.326) 
AGE_62 0.205 1.072 0.241 
 (0.266) (0.266)*** (0.284) 
AGE_63 0.257 1.827 -0.079 
 (0.430) (0.427)*** (0.478) 
EDUCATION2 0.224 0.361 0.238 
 (0.181) (0.186)* (0.181) 
EDUCATION3 0.016 0.355 0.022 
 (0.235) (0.230) (0.221) 
EDUCATION4 0.205 0.719 0.448 
 (0.345) (0.320)** (0.316) 
FEMALE 0.123 -0.374 -0.242 
 (0.177) (0.162)** (0.166) 
MARRIED -0.144 -0.204 -0.125 
 (0.181) (0.184) (0.176) 
WAGE_2 -0.406 -0.592 -0.132 
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 (0.195)** (0.194)*** (0.192) 
WAGE_3 -0.471 -0.463 0.098 
 (0.279)* (0.282)* (0.257) 
WAGE_4 -0.866  -1.049 0.476 
 (0.417)** (0.386)*** (0.345) 
CAREER 0.041 -0.014 -0.005 
 (0.018)** (0.015) (0.013) 
ILLNESS 0.319 -0.164 -0.015 
 (0.161)** (0.168)** (0.147) 
CAPACITY -0.052 0.057 0.085 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.051)* 
PRIVATE_SECTOR -0.094 0.586 -0.230 
 (0.161) (0.159)*** (0.162) 
HEAVY_MENTALLY -0.136 -1.163  
 (0.355) (0.446)***  
HEAVY_PHYSICALLY -0.299 0.114  
 (0.586) (0.397)  
OWN_PLAN -0.149 -0.439  
 (0.222) (0.240)*  
PIPELINE 0.185 -0.563  
 (0.209) (0.237)**  
SMALL_PLANT -0.314   
 (0.194)   
TEMPORARY -0.688   
 (0.549)   
CONSTANT -1.584 -0.475 -0.840 
 (0.774)** (0.614) (0.609) 
Note: Multivariate probit estimation with simulated maximum likelihood. N=382.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% 
 
Our third dependent variable, continuing work while retired, is difficult to predict. The only 
clearly significant effect is that good working capacity has a positive impact. Having 
anticipated retirement age above 63 does not affect plans to continue working.  
 
The estimated correlations of the first and third and second and third equations are clearly 
small (-0.09 and –0.10, respectively). The correlation of the first and second equations (partial 
retirement and retirement age) is 0.32, but significant only at 15 per cent level. This indicates 
that PARTIAL_RETIREMENT might not be endogenous for RETIREMENT_OVER_63. 
Estimation of the models jointly may still be more efficient than estimation of separate models. 
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4.2. Robustness analysis 
 
To investigate whether our conclusions are changed if we change the specification of the 
model, we conducted several additional estimates. Their results are not reported in the tables, 
but we comment on them briefly.  
 
As a first robustness check we included some additional variables in the model. Instead of age 
group dummies, we tried including a single dummy for those over 60 years. This did not 
change our main conclusions. The working conditions variables HEAVY_MENTALLY and 
HEAVY_PHYSICALLY are somewhat problematic, since a relatively low share individuals in 
the older age groups have answered in the survey that these are significant problems. Extending 
the definition of heavy work does not give any significant coefficients for these variables. 
 
As a further robustness check we conducted two other kinds of estimations. We estimated the 
models as univariate probits. The main differences to the results reported above were that the 
wage effects in the equation for PARTIAL_RETIREMENT were not as significant, having 
chronic illness now had a negative and significant effect of RETIRE_OVER_63, and females 
dummy had a significant negative and the highest education group positive effect on 
RETIRE_AND_WORK. Otherwise our conclusions were not affected. Further, we used more 
information on the anticipated retirement age and modelled it as an ordered variable with 
classes below 63, 63, and over 63. In the ordered probit estimation of this model18 all the other 
exogenous variables that were significant in Table 2 remained significant, except for the 
education variables and the highest wage group dummies. On the other hand, CAREER and 
CAPACITY were now significant with expected signs. Partial retirement was insignificant also 
in this estimation. 
 
Since the retirement behaviour of men and women may be different (besides different 
intercepts), we estimated the three-equation probit model separately for them.19 Among 
women, the main differences to the estimates for the whole sample were that part-time pension 
is more common among those with the highest education level, but the highest wage levels no 
longer have significant coefficients (as opposed to Table 2 where they were significantly 
                                                
18 The sample was restricted to those above age 56 and below 63, since all of the three alternatives are no longer 
available for the 63 year olds. 
19 We dropped the variable TEMPORARY from these estimations, since in some subgroups the number of 
temporary workers was fairly small. For example, there are no men who both have a temporary contract and are on 
part-time pension. 
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negative). The use of unemployment pension pipeline by the employer had now a significant 
positive effect on part-time pension among women. Further, aspirations to continue working 
beyond age 63 are less common among married women. This is understandable since husbands 
tend to be slightly older than wives and spouses are likely to want to retire at the same time. 
CAREER and physically heavy work were now significant (with negative coefficients), 
whereas ILLNESS and mentally heavy work were not. Among men, the most interesting 
difference to the full sample results were that part-time pension is less likely among married 
men. Again, this may reflect joint retirement decisions of the spouses who have an age 
difference.  
 
Since our data is based on a sample of employed persons, there is a potential selection problem. 
Those who have opted for early retirement e.g. in the form of disability pension are not 
included in the sample. The remaining individuals may therefore not be a random sample of the 
age group 56 to 64. Since we do not observe those who have already retired, a normal selection 
model cannot be estimated. Since the selection bias is essentially an omitted variable problem 
(the selection correction term being omitted), we can argue that the problem has been at least 
partly diminished by having included observables, like health and working capacity, that 
influence the selection of individuals to early retirement or staying at work.  
 
Bloom and Killingsworth (1985) suggest a method for estimating a selection model using only 
the observations in the truncated sample. In their model the (single) dependent variable is 
continuous. However, in our case the dependent variables are binary (and in principle we have 
a multivariate model). As a robustness check of our estimations we treated the univariate 
models as linear probability models and estimated them separately with the Bloom-
Killingsworth procedure. In the selection models we included CAPACITY and ILLNESS (but 
excluded them from the primary models), as well as FEMALE and MARRIED. This estimation 
did not change our conclusions on the main determinants of the retirement behaviour variables, 
although the results were somewhat sensitive to the choice of the variables included in the 
selection model. Especially in the models for RETIRE_OVER_63 and RETIRE_AND_WORK 
it was difficult to model the selection. In any case, the estimations did not change our 
conclusions on the impact of part-time pension on retirement age aspirations. Since the model 
can be estimated only because of the nonlinear functional form and we have treated the primary 
equations as linear probability models, these results should, however, be treated with caution. 
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To summarize our findings, we did not find a significant positive effect of partial retirement on 
anticipated retirement age in any of the robustness checks. Therefore our conclusion that partial 
retirement does not seem to lengthen the working life seems robust. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Optimally, partial retirement is a “double dividend” that satisfies both the needs of individuals 
and the sustainability of the pension system. Individuals prefer shorter working hours at the age 
when their working capacity is slowing down. From the point of view of the pension system, 
the other side of the double dividend rests on the assumption that partial retirement leads to 
longer working careers.  
 
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of partial retirement in Finland, where part-time 
pensions have become a popular way of achieving a smooth transition from work to retirement. 
Employment rates of older workers have risen rapidly, and part of this increase in the 
employment rates is attributable to this scheme, especially in the age group 60-64. The scheme 
gives a rather tempting opportunity to ageing workers to reduce their working hours i.e. to 
move from full-time work to part-time work. It is a convenient way to reduce working hours in 
the current job, since half of the corresponding loss in wage income is compensated as pension 
income. Furthermore, while on part-time pension new old-age pension rights accrue both from 
the part-time work and from the difference between full-time and part-time wage. The costs of the 
scheme are borne collectively by the whole pension system and not by the employer in 
question directly.  
  
We have considered three retirement decisions, which we think are related to each other. They 
are: (i) whether to retire on part-time pension, (ii) whether to continue work beyond the lower 
age limit of the flexible old-age pension and, (iii) whether to work while on retirement. We 
have hypothesized a recursive structure in the process how the individuals formulate their 
retirement plans and aspirations. The decision on part-time retirement is made first (it has 
already been made before the survey that we have used as our data). Given this decision, the 
individuals anticipate whether they plan to work beyond the age 63. Further, given their 
anticipated retirement age, they indicate whether they plan to continue working while on 
retirement. The corresponding three-equation multivariate probit model was estimated with 
simulated maximum likelihood. 
 20
 
The main focus of our interest has been whether the use of part-time pension has a postponing 
effect on the timing of retirement on the old-age pension. The analysis indicates that being 
already on part-time pension does not have a significant effect on the probability of thinking 
about continuing working after age 63. Our robustness analysis did not alter this result: we did 
not find a significant positive effect of partial retirement on anticipated retirement age in any of 
our alternative estimations. Neither did we find a significant effect of anticipated retirement 
age on future plans to continue working while on retirement.  
 
Our results refer to the concern that being on partial retirement does not increase the 
probability of preferring to stay longer at work. This gives support to the worries that partial 
retirement is a tool that helps in increasing the labour force participation of the aging labour 
force, but at a relatively high cost.  
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Appendix 1: Description of variables 
 
Dependent variables 
 
PARTIAL_RETIREMENT Dummy for being on partial retirement or having applied 
for partial retirement 
RETIREMENT_OVER_63 Dummy for preferring a retirement age of over 63 years. 
In robustness analysis, preferred retirement age is coded 
as an ordered variable: below 63, 63, over 63. 
RETIRE_AND_WORK Dummy for planning to continue working while on 
retirement 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
AGE_i Dummies for ages i = 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63 
(reference group 57) 
EDUCATION1 Dummy for comprehensive education (reference group) 
EDUCATION2 Dummy for upper secondary or vocational education 
EDUCATION3 Dummy for polytechnic or lower university degree 
EDUCATION4 Dummy for higher university degree 
FEMALE Dummy for females 
MARRIED Dummy for married or cohabiting 
WAGE_i Monthly wage group dummies, i = 1,…,4. Groups defined 
as € 1900 or below, € 1901-2700, € 2701-3600, above € 
3600. Wage groups are self-reported, but in case of partial 
retirement, the wage has been calculated from register 
information on partial pension or previous year’s taxable 
income (see footnote 11).  
CAREER Years of work experience that has accrued pension 
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CAPACITY Self-assessment of working capacity. The variable is a score 
from 0 (total inability to work) to 10 (top working capacity) 
ILLNESS Dummy for persons suffering from medically diagnosed 
chronic illness 
HEAVY_PHYSICALLY  Dummy for current tasks physically ‘very demanding’ 
HEAVY_MENTALLY  Dummy for current tasks mentally ‘very demanding’ 
TEMPORARY Dummy for temporary employment relationship 
SMALL_PLANT Dummy for employer plant having less than 10 employees 
PIPELINE Dummy for the use of unemployment pension pipeline at 
the workplace during the last three years 
OWN_PLAN Dummy for having voluntary private pension insurance 
PRIVATE_SECTOR Dummy for working in the private sector (instead of the 
state or municipalities) 
